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Over the last decade a new consensus model has emerged in monetary macroeconomics, labelled 
New Keynesian macroeconomics (Clarida et al., 1999). It consists of three simple building blocs: a 
forward-looking IS-equation that is derived from the optimization problem of a representative 
household, a forward-looking Phillips curve that maps the optimal pricing decisions of 
monopolistically competitive firms facing restrictions on their ability to adjust wages or prices in a 
flexible manner, and a relationship that describes how monetary policy is conducted. In Bofinger, 
Mayer and Wollmershäuser (2002a, 2002b) we developed the BMW model which takes this 
standard dynamic macro model to an intermediate audience in a down-to-earth fashion. This paper 
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Over the last decade a new consensus model has started to emerge which is commonly used to 
evaluate and discuss systematic monetary policy (see for example Clarida et al., 1999). This so-
called New Keynesian macro model shares a very simple dynamic structure that is centered 
around three building blocs: an intertemporal IS-curve which can be derived from the 
optimization behaviour of households allocating among others consumption optimally over time, 
a forward-looking aggregate supply relationship labeled New Keynesian Phillips curve which 
maps the optimal pricing decisions of firms being faced with restrictions to adjust prices or 
wages in a flexible manner, and a relationship depicting the way according to which monetary 
policy is conducted.  
 
Up to now there are only a view approaches available that try to present the new consensus 
model to an intermediate audience (Romer, 2000, Walsh, 2002). In Bofinger, Mayer and 
Wollmershäuser (2002a, 2002b) we also presented an algebraic and graphical treatment of a 
static version of the New Keynesian macro model in which we preserved many of its main 
insights. Despite its simplicity this so-called BMW model can deal with questions like flexible 
inflation targeting, simple monetary policy rules, stability and central bank credibility at an 
intermediate macro level. 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate the proximity of the static BMW approach to 
a dynamic New Keynesian macro model. It is structured as follows: In Section 2 we shortly 
summarize the mathematical foundations of our static approach by deriving the key relationships 
from a straightforward Lagragian approach. In Section 3 we illustrate the mathematical backbone 
of the standard New Keynesian macro model that was originally proposed by Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler (1999). In Section 4 we will then demonstrate that the BMW model can be viewed as a 
static approximation of this New Keynesian macro model. We show under which assumptions 
the impulse response functions and the efficient frontiers of the two models converge. 
 
2  Optimal monetary policy in the BMW model 
The BMW model consists of two structural equations: 
 
  1 
(2.1)     1 yab r =− + ε
(2.2)   .  02 dy π=π + +ε
 
Equation (2.1) is an IS equation according to which the output gap y depends on autonomous 
demand components a, on the real interest rate r and on a demand shock ε . Equation (2.2) 
represents a Phillips curve. Deviations of the inflation rate 
1
π from its medium term target level 
 occur in response to movements in the output gap and to supply shocks ε . In contrast to 
standard expectations-augmented Phillips curves (see for example Romer, 2001, Chapter 5) we 
replaced the expected inflation rate by the inflation target 
0 π 2
0 π . The rationale behind this is that we 
assume that the central bank possesses a high degree of credibility, so that the private sector’s 
inflation expectations are identical with the central bank’s inflation target. All the structural 
parameters of the model are assumed to be positive, and the disturbances ε  and ε  are i.i.d. 
random variables with zero mean and variances 
1 2
2
1 ε σ  and 
2
2 ε σ  respectively. 
 
The policy instrument of the central bank is the real interest rate r. If the central bank pursues an 
optimum intererst rate policy, it sets its interest rates so as to minimize a loss function L 
 
(2.3)     ()
2 2
0 Ly = π−π +λ
 
that sums up deviations of inflation from its target level and deviations of output from potential 
(i.e. non-zero output gaps). The parameter λ represents the preferences of the central bank with 
respect to output stabilization.  
 
The optimization problem of the central bank is solved in two steps. First, it is important to 
recognize that the central bank directly influences the output gap via equation (2.1) and that it 
only indirectly influences inflation through its impact on the output gap, and hence via equation 
(2.2). From this follows, second, that is suffices – from the point of view of optimal control 
theory – to consider the output gap as ‘policy variable’ and to determine the optimum output gap. 
In other words, the use of the instrument itself is not associated with any real costs so that the 
loss function is minimized subject to the Phillips curve only. Thus, we get the following 
Lagrangian: 
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(2.4)   .  () (
2 2
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The Lagrange multiplier   measures the costs if the central deviates from its optimal solution. 
Taking the derivative with respect to the output gap and the inflation rate we arrive at the 








(2.6)   ( ) 0 2 ξ=− π−π . 
 
Eliminating the Larange multiplier ξ  and solving the resulting expression for π gives the 
consolidated foc: 
 




π=π − . 
 
Following Svensson and Woodford (2003) we can give a first intuition of inflation targeting to 
macroeconomic students at the intermediate level by equation (2.7) which is the so-called 
targeting rule of the central bank. A targeting rule gives a high level specification of monetary 
policy, that is directly derived from the central bank’s strategy. Therefore it can be characterised 
as a high level specification of monetary policy and is well in line with the current institutional 
environment of leading inflation targeters that aims at committing the central bank at the target 
level. Given the structure of the model it is the task of the central bank to control the output gap 
in such a way that equation (2.7) will hold with equality in the absence of factors beyond the 
control of monetary policy (e.g., shocks to the market for borrowed reserves). 
 
The optimum output gap consistent with the targeting rule of the central bank is obtained by 
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The optimal interest rate can finally be represented as a function of the exogenous variables  1 ε  
and   by inserting equation (2.8) into equation (2.1) and by solving the resulting expression for 













The instrument rule is a low level specification of monetary policy as it is not specific to the 
central bank’s strategy. Hence by only looking at the instrument rule it is hard to guess which 
specific strategy the central bank follows. Additionally in real live no central bank has yet been 
committed to an instrument rule despite its popularity in academic literature. As noted by 
Svensson (2003) it is not necessary to specify the instrument rule explicitly as the central bank’s 
strategy is suffiently described by its loss function and the associated targeting rule. Nevertheless 
instrument rules have its virtues as they directly specify the reaction of monetary policy to the 
exogenous supply and demand disturbances. This optimal monetary policy rule at the instrument 
level is described by the following characteristics: 
•  The optimal response to demand shocks  1 ε  does not depend on preferences  . Therefore, 
each preference type λ adjusts the real interest rate according to 
λ
( r1 b = ) 1 ε  which fully 
closes the initial output gap. 
•  The reaction of the central bank to supply shocks depends on preferences  . A central bank 
that only cares about inflation ( ), requires a strong real rate increase and accordingly a 
high output loss. With an increasing 
λ
0 λ=
λ the interest rate response weakens and accordingly 
the output loss decreases whereas the inflation loss increases. 
  4 
•  In equilibrium ( ) the real interest rate will be given by  . In line with 
Blinder (1998, p. 31) this rate can be regarded as a neutral real short-term interest rate. 




3  Optimal monetary policy in the New Keynesian model 
The New Keynesian macroeconomic model is a simple dynamic equilibrium model which nests 
a forward-looking IS curve (3.1) and a forward-looking Phillips curve (3.2) with nominal 
rigidities. These two equations are the backbone of a sticky price model (see e.g. Clarida et al., 
1999). As both behavioral equations evolve explicitly from optimizing households and firms, 
current economic behavior depends critically on expectations of the future course of monetary 
policy, as described by the expected path of future short term interest rates: 
 
(3.1)     () t t t1 t t t1 0 1 , t yE y b iE r ++ =− − π − +  
(3.2)   .  tt t 1 t Ed y + π= δ π + + ε
 
In the IS equation (3.1)   denotes the expected output gap of the next period based on the 
information available in period t. According to the Fisher equation the current real interest rate is 
defined as the difference between the current nominal short-term interest rate   and the expected 
inflation rate over the next period 
tt 1 Ey+
t i
tt 1 E + π .   is the average natural real rate of interest which is 
consistent with a zero output gap, and the term 
0 r
1,t ε  denotes a demand shock. With b 0 >  the 
output gap   is negatively related to deviations of the real interest rate from its natural rate. The 
Phillips curve (3.2) relates inflation 
t y
t π  positively to the output gap   and the expected inflation 
rate of the next period based on information in the current period E
t y
tt 1 + π . The term ε  denotes a 
supply shock.  
2,t
 
The two disturbance terms are assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process 
 
(3.3)     1,t 1 1,t 1 1,t ˆ − ε= ρ ε + ε
(3.4)     2,t 2 2,t 1 2,t ˆ − ε= ρ ε + ε
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where   and where both  12 0, ≤ρ ρ ≤1 1,t ˆ ε  and  2,t ˆ ε  are i.i.d. random variables with zero mean and 
variances   and σ  respectively. These autocorrelated shocks serve as a substitute in simple 
New Keynesian models to mask omitted economic structure. In the IS relationsship endogeneous 
persistence can be implemented by assuming habit formation. This means that some fraction of 
households optimises while another fraction of households simply centres today’s consumption 
decisions around last periods consumption level. This habit formation is usually referred to as 
‘rule-of-thumb behaviour’ (Amato and Laubach Thomas, 2003). It virtually does not produce 
any computational costs as households do not need to optimize. Additionally rule of thumb 
setters learn as the last period’s output gap incorporates information of those parts of households 
that optimised. Equally one can generate endogeneous persistence in the Phillips curve by 
introducing rule-of-thumb behaviour on some part of price setters (Christiano et al., 2001). 
Hence those economic agents that are not called upon to reset prices optimally simply update 
their prices by following a rule-of-thumb. In particular one may assume that some price setters 
update their prices by yesterday’s inflation rate. Again rule-of-thumb setters implicitly learn as 







The objective function of the central bank is an intertemporal loss function, summing up the 
expectations about discounted current and future deviations of inflation from target and output 
from potential: 
 
(3.5)   () {}
2 2








=δ π − π + λ  
  ∑ . 
 
The parameter δ  denotes the discount factor
1, and the parameter λ measures the weight 
policymakers attach to output stabilization relative to inflation stabilization.  
 
For the solution of the central bank’s dynamic optimization problem we adopted an approach 
which basically draws on Clarida et al. (1999) and Svensson (2003). For the reasons already 
outlined in Section 2, the intertemporal loss function (3.5) is minimized subject to the Phillips 
curve equation. This leads to the following Lagrangian 
                                                 
1 Woodford (2003, Chapter 6) showed that this form of intertemporal loss function can be derived as a quadratic 
approximation to (the negative) expected utility of the representative household in the same optimizing sticky-
price model as is used to derive structural equations (3.1) and (3.2).  
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(3.6)   () ( { ) }
2 2





+τ +τ +τ +τ +τ+ +τ
τ=
 =δ π− π+ λ + ξ π− δ π −
 ∑ d y  
 
where   denotes the τ-period-ahead expectations of variable x, conditional on the central 
bank’s information in period t on the state of the economy and the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy (which is equal to 
t, t x +τ
tt Ex+τ). The term in parantheses following the dynamic 
Lagrange multiplier  t, t +τ ξ  represents the central bank’s τ-period-ahead forecast of equation (3.2) 
in period t. Differentiating with respect to  t, t +τ π  and  t, t y +τ  gives the two first-order conditions 
 











A basic assumption underlying the first foc is that the central bank takes private sector 
expectations about next period inflation rate  t1 , t +τ+ π  as given. The literature typically refers to 
this kind of procedure as discretionary optimization, in contrast to optimization under 
commitment.
2 Setting  0 τ =  and eliminating the Lagrange multiplier leads to the consolidated 
foc: 
 
(3.9)   () tt
d




Obviously the targeting rule of the central bank is identical to relationship (2.7) which was 
derived in the static BMW model. Henceforth optimal monetary policy is conducted in an 
identical fashion. Inserting (3.9) into (3.2) yields the following forward-looking first-order 










π =π+ π + ε
δλ δλ δ
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which can be solved using the MSV (minimal set of state variables) approach of McCallum 











2 , t . 
 
















Inserting (3.11) into the consolidated foc (3.9) yields the dynamic law of motion of the output 
gap: 
 





−δ  =π −  +λ−δλ +λ−δλρ 
2 , t ε . 
 










ρ −δ  =π −  +λ−δλ +λ−δλρ 
ε . 
 
With the dynamics of inflation and output at hand we can finally derive the optimal interest rate 
rule. Inserting (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14) into the aggregate demand equation (3.1) and solving the 











λρ − ρ +
=+ π +ε+ ε
+λ−δλ +λ−δλρ
, t





2 If a central bank credibly commits to a once-and-for-all policy rule, it internalizes the effects of its own interest 





t, t 0 t, t t 1 , t 20
ττ τ −
+τ +τ +τ− δπ − π− δ ξ −δ δξ =
  8 
If a central bank follows this rule 
•  it perfectly offsets demand shocks  1,t ε  as the interest rate impacts on the output gap with 
a factor b; 
•  it faces a trade-off in the case of supply shocks  2,t ε  which crucially depends on the 
preferences of the central bank λ; 
•  it keeps the nominal interest rate constant in the absence of shocks. 
 
A basic requirement for ensuring the long-run neutrality of money is that   approaches unity. 
From a theoretical point of view setting 
δ
δ  equal to unity is somewhat problematic as δ depicts 
the discount factor of a representative household that maximizes its utility. It can be shown that 
the neutral real interest rate   is defined as  0 r ( ) log − δ . Thus, in order to avoid a value of   equal 
to zero,   must be below 1.
0 r
δ
3 The reason why this discount factor also appears in the Phillips 
curve (3.2) is that profits of firms are assumed to be transferred to households so that prices are 
discounted with δ. From an empirical perspective the postulation that δ should be one is less 
problematic as estimated discount factors are typically not statistically different from one 
(Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). In the case of  1 δ = , the long-run inflation rate and the long-
run inflation expectations converge to the level of the inflation target ( tt t 1 E + 0 π =π= π ), the long-
run output gap is zero ( ), and the long-run nominal interest rate equals the sum of the 




t0 = +π ). Otherwise there will be a long-
run trade-off between the level of the inflation target (which can be freely chosen by the central 
bank) and the level of the output gap. To see this assume that  1 δ < , meaning that the costs 
resulting from the anticipation of deviations of inflation from its target level and of output from 
potential are weighted more strongly as they occur earlier in time. Inflation will then be biased 
downwards ( ) at the expense of a positive output gap which crucially depends on the 
central bank’s choice of π : 
t π< π 0
0
 




−δ  =π  +λ−δλ 
0 >




3 Quarterly models often assume δ = 0.99 (0.995), so r0 = 4.0 % (2.0 %). 
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The point that the long-run Phillips curve is steep and not vertical was also made – among others 
– by Woodford (1999, p. 32). 
 
4  Approximating the New Keynesian model by the BMW model 
The dynamics of the New Keynesian model can be simplified substantially, if we specify two of 
the model’s parameters. First, we set δ  equal to one. This has the additional convenient effect 
that in the limit, after scaling the intertemporal loss function (3.5) by a factor (1−δ), the 
intertemporal loss approaches the weighted sum of the unconditional variances of inflation and 
the output gap (Svensson, 2003): 
 
(4.1)   () [ ] [ ] tt 1 lim 1 L Var Var y
δ→ −δ = π +λ t . 
 
By interpreting the intertemporal loss in terms of the variances of the goal variables, the 
optimality of an interest rate rule (such as (3.15)) can then be illustrated by the so-called efficient 
frontier which depicts the second-order trade-off between the variances of inflation and output 
(instead of the aforementioned trade-off between their levels which is avoided when 
)(Taylor, 1979). Hence although there is no trade off at the level of the variables, there is a 
trade off in the second moments that is compatible with the same steady state solution. 
1 δ=
 
Second, we will gradually lower the autocorrelation of the supply shock ρ  to zero. This 
exercise is most crucial for the purpose of the present Section as 
2
2 ρ  turns out to be the exclusive 
source of dynamic movements in a simple New Keynesian macro model as originally proposed 
by Clarida et al. (1999). 
 
4.1  The dynamics of the inflation rate 
For   the dynamics of the inflation rate as expressed in equation (3.11) reduces to  1 δ=
 





, t . 
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According to (4.2) deviations of the inflation rate from its target only occur in the event of 
supply shocks. The extent of the deviation crucially depends on the preference parameter of the 
central bank, and hence on the extent to which the central bank accommodates supply shocks. By 
additionally setting ρ=  equation (4.2) further reduces to  2 0
 




, t  
 
which is identical to equation (2.9) of the BMW model. 
 
The expected inflation rate for the next period which was given by equation (3.12) can also be 
substantially simplified after inserting  1 δ =  and  2 0 ρ = : 
 
(4.4)   .  tt 1 0 E + π= π
 
Equation (4.4) implies that in the long-run inflation is expected to be anchored by the central 
bank’s inflation target. Recall that this was a basic simplification for the formulation of the 
Phillips curve in the BMW model. In Section 2 we justified equation (4.4) by the assumption that 
the central bank’s monetary policy is credible and that the private sector therefore believes in the 
central bank’s commitment to the inflation target. Now we provide the analytical proof of this 
simplification which is valid in a macroeconomic environment in which the duration of shocks is 
limited to one period. 
 
4.2  The dynamics of the output gap 
If we set   to be 1, the non-neutrality of money in equation (3.13) disappears and the dynamics 
of the output gap evolve according to 
δ
 







, t . 
 
As was the case with the inflation rate, deviations of output from potential only occur in response 
to supply shocks which are only partially compensated by the central bank. By setting  1 δ =  and 
 equation (4.5) can be further simplified to  2 0 ρ=
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, t  
 
which is then identical to equation (2.8) of the BMW model. 
 
4.3  The optimal interest rate rule 
For   and   the optimal interest rate rule of the dynamic New Keynesian model 
simplifies to 














With the nominal interest rate being defined as  tt t t ir E + = +π and with equation (4.4), the policy 










, t  
 
which is identical to the optimal policy rule (2.10) of the BMW model if the neutral real short-
term interest rate   equals a/ .  0 r b
 
4.4  The dynamics of the two models 
The dependence of the dynamic behavior of the New Keynesian model on the autocorrelation 
coefficient of the supply shock ρ  and its identity with the BMW model for δ=  and  2 1 2 0 ρ =  
can be illustrated by calculating and depicting the impulse response functions of the New 
Keynesian model. Figure 1 shows the responses of the nominal interest rate, the output gap and 
the inflation rate to a one standard deviation supply shock which hits the economy in period 1. 
For this simulation the model was calibrated as in Bofinger et al. (2002b): b 0.4 = ,  d0 . 3 4 = , 
,  ,  , π= , and  1 λ= 1 δ= 2,t Var 1  ε=  0 2 0 r2 =  (implying a value of a in the BMW model of 0.8). 
The basic message of Figure 1 is that the lower  2 ρ , the lower the persistence of the deviation of 
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t i,   , and   from their equilibrium levels 4 ( t y t π 0 r 0 = +π
2
), 0, and 2 ( ), respectively. For 
, the dynamics are reduced to a single peak in period 1 which is typical for a comparative 
static model – such as the BMW model – since in the period directly following the shock (period 












Figure 1: Responses to a supply shock 
























While the comparative statics appear to be plausible at first sight, the high initial jump and the 
gradual return of the variables that follows the jump for  0 >  require a somewhat deeper look 
at the dynamics of the New Keynesian model. To explain this we take the Phillips curve as an 
example. Equation (3.2) not only produces a positive correlation between the level of inflation 
and real output, it also defines a negative correlation between the expected change in inflation 
and real output (for  ). The dynamic implication of these opposite-signed correlations is that, 
in response to, say, a positive shock to inflation, the level of inflation will rise, while the change 
in inflation will always be negative. This can only occur if inflation jumps up immediately in 




4 While the New Keynesian models is derived from sound economic principles, this dynamic implication is 
seriously at odds with the data. There is a host of empirical evidence suggesting that both inflation and output 
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4.5  The efficient frontier 
The fact that the BMW model represents a special case of the New Keynesian model can also be 
demonstrated by computing the efficient frontier. On the basis of equations (4.2) and (4.5) the 
variances of inflation and output can be calcualted as 
 







, t   π= ε    +λ−λρ 
 








, t   =ε    +λ−λρ 
. 
 











 ε   ε=  −ρ
. 
 
The values of  [ ] t Var y  and  [ ] t Var π  that are associated with different values of   are the plotted 
as the convex efficient frontier in Figure 2. At points on the frontiers, it is not possible for the 
policymakers to reduce the variance of inflation without increasing the variance of the output 
gap, given that the central bank sets interest rates according to the optimum policy rule (3.15). 
Policymakers can, however, choose alternative points along the frontier by varying the relative 
weight   that they put on output versus inflation stabilization. For the construction of the curves 
we increased the preference parameter 
λ
λ
λ from 0.01 (high preference for inflation stabilization; 
the lower right end of the frontier) to 10 (a high preference for output stabilization; the upperleft 
end of the frontier) in steps of 0.01. With a falling  2 ρ , both,  2,t Var  ε   and the squared term in 
brackets in equations (4.9) and (4.10) will become smaller so that the efficient frontier shifts 
towards the origin of the  [ ] [ ] t Va −π t Var y r  space. For  2 0 ρ =  the efficient frontier of the New 
                                                                                                                                                             
exhibit gradual and ‘humpshaped’ responses to real and monetary shocks, instead of the ‘jump’ behavior resulting 
from purely forward-looking model specifications (see e.g. Estrella and Fuhrer, 2002). 
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Keynesian model is identical to that of the BMW model which is shown by Figure 19 in 
Bofinger et al. (2002a). 
 
Figure 2: Efficient frontiers 























This paper, for the time being, terminates the BMW project. Within this project we have written 
five papers over the last 2 years that aim at bringing the basic insights of a new class of dynamic 
models labelled New Keynesian macroeconomics to an intermediate audience. The purpose of 
this final paper was to clarify the proximity of the BMW model to standard New Keynesian 
macro models à la Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). The key to understand this proximity is to 
see that under discretion the first-order conditions that govern the dynamics of the system are 
identical. Therefore, we showed that when demand and supply shocks converge from an first-
order autoregressive process to a white noise process the ‘dynamics’ of the model (as 
encapsulated in the consolidated first order condition) become the same. To illustrate this point, 
we showed the convergence of the impulse response functions and the efficient frontiers. 
 
The authors are sure that the IS/LM model has come into its ages and will be replaced gradually. 
We hope to equip those who have to teach monetary macroeconomics at an intermediate level 
with a powerful alternative that provides graphical and analytical devices in a unified approach. 
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A  Solving the forward-looking first-order difference equation 
A.1  The MSV approach 
A very tedious way to solve a forward-looking first-order difference equation of the following 
type 
 
(A.1)    with  tt t 1 xa b E x c z + =+ + t
, t (A.2)     tz t 1 z zz − =ρ +ε
 
(where   is the endogenous variable,   is an exogenous variable, a, b, c and ρ  are constant 
coefficients, and   is white noise) is to apply the procedure of forward iteration. The upshot of 
this procedure would be that   depends only on z  (and the constants). McCallum (1983) 
therefore proposed an alternative solution procedure according to which it suffices to conjecture 
a solution of the difference equation that contains a minimal set of state variables (the so-called 
MSV approach). Specifically, he considered the following type of solution 




(A.3)     tt xz =α+β
 
where the constants α and β are yet to be determined. Forming expectations of (A.3) (and 
considering (A.2)) yields 
 
(A.4)   tt 1 zt Ex z + = α+βρ . 
 
Inserting (A.4) into (A.1) gives 
 
(A.5)   .  () ( tz xa b b c =+ α +β ρ + ) t z
 
By applying the method of undetermined coefficients, we obtain 
 















Thus, a general solution to the forward-looking first-order difference equation (A.1) is  
 









A.2  Applying the MSV approach to the New Keynesian model 
The MSV approach can be applied to solve the forward-looking first-order difference equation 














The shock term   follows the first-order autoregressive process specified by equation (3.4):  2,t ε
 
(A.10)   .  2,t 2 2,t 1 2,t ˆ − ε= ρ ε + ε
 
In this system the minimal set of state variables includes only  2,t ε , so the solution will be of the 
form 
 
(A.11)   .  t2 π= α + β ε , t
 
Taking expectations of (A.11), 
 
(A.12)   ,  tt 1 2 2 , t E + π= α + β ρ ε
 
inserting (A.12) into (A.9), and solving the resulting expression for  t π  yields  
 







 δλα+ π λ+βδλρ  π= + ε   λ+ λ+  
, t . 
 
Setting the first term in paranthesis equal to α and the second term in paranthesis equal to β, 



























λ+ −δ λ λ+ −δλρ
2 , t . 
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